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Abstract
How does heterogeneity affect rule and order among the members of international society? Theories 
that are based on the pursuit of national interest have been built upon the assumption that the members 
of international society are homogenous. However, in the history of international society, with the 
exception of very short periodic intervals as anomalies, the relationships among countries have never 
been completely divorced from the state of their domestic regimes. This paper presents three ways to 
conceptualize how the diversity serves as a determining factor of state of politics.
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Introduction
Questions of how to construct standard legal procedure for dealing with conflict; or how to introduce order 
into a society whose members have a vast variety of traits - such as differences in ethnicity; religion; or class 
- have become an extremely important theme in the study of politics. Perhaps the first thing that may come 
across to the reader would be Lijphart’s “consociational democracy” (Lijphart 1977). This theory conceptual-
izes the state of democracy in certain multiethnic countries, where consensus is given higher priority than ma-
jority rule. On the other hand, there have also been attempts to deal with problems related to the existence of 
minorities in a forceful way. This method involves physically eradicating those who bear a different trait from 
that of the majority, via forced migration or ethnic cleansing (Jackson-Preece 1998).
The previous paragraph exemplifies that there is a close relationship between diversity and order in the do-
mestic society. How then, have problems related to order that are caused by diversity in the international so-
ciety been conceptualized? It is striking that the number of attempts to theorize or conceptualize problems of 
this nature are at best scarce. Take Waltz’s argument on the international system, as an example. According to 
Waltz, individual nations are hypothesized to be “like units” (Waltz 1979). This theory completely ignores the 
possibility that heterogeneity in the domestic traits of individual nations may have a close bearing on order in 
the international society.
Of course, it would not be entirely fair to say that there have been no studies related to the relationship 
between heterogeneity and international relations. One exception would be Raymond Aron’s study. Aron pro-
posed the concepts of “homogenous system” and “heterogenous system”. He defined “homogenous systems” 
as “systems those in which the states belong to the same type, obey the same conception of policy”; and 
“heterogenous systems” as “systems in which the states are organized according to different principles and 
appeal to contradictory values” (Aron 1966: 99-100). According to him, the main difference between the two 
systems is the homogeneity or heterogeneity of the domestic political traits among a set of countries. Coun-
tries whose domestic traits are largely homogenous tend to form relatively stable relationships among them-
selves, while countries whose traits are largely heterogenous tend to form confrontational relationships where 
peaceful settlement of dispute or compromise tend to be their main point of interest. In fact, Aron brought this 
argument one step further, by showing that the international society has undergone dynamic changes over its 
history due to changes in the condition of the two systems raised above. What makes this argument so charac-
teristic is that the homogeneity of domestic political traits across countries is seen as the origin of order in the 
international society.
This paper aims to further the theoretical analysis on the relationship between the level of diversity among 
the members of international society, and the condition of order in the society itself. The analysis will be con-
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ducted as follows. First, the effect that heterogeneity among nations has on the state of order in the interna-
tional society will be explained. Second, the issue of how the international system has evolved in accordance 
to changes in the degree of heterogeneity across nations will be exposed. Finally, historical case studies will 
be analyzed as a means to provide further theoretical appeal to the two concepts raised above.
1. A framework for Analyzing the International Politics of Heterogeneity
(1) The Problematization of Domestic Regimes at the International Level
While the previous section introduced Aron’s theory on homogenous / heterogenous systems, this section 
will focus on why heterogeneity among the members of the international society has a close bearing on the 
instability of order within the society. As a starting point, it is crucial to consider why the domestic regimes or 
traits of other nations might be problematic to one’s own nation; and why countries often aspire to have other 
nations establish political regimes that are similar to their own. A major explanatory factor would be that of 
norms. Because countries often perceive their own regimes to be of the highest value, they may feel that they 
have a moral obligation to spread that regime to other nations, much in the spirit of the Crusaders.
In addition to the above, there are more rational explanatory factors (Owen 2010: Ch.2). First, rulers often 
have an incentive to ensure that particular regimes -in most cases regimes similar to their own- are being es-
tablished in other nations, as this helps to ensure the maintenance of their authority in their own nations. This 
is an issue of regime security, where incumbent authorities seek ways to maintain their political power from 
the threat or challenges posed by opposing domestic forces. When competition of ideologies exist in the home 
country, the presence of different regimes; or the occurrence of changes in regimes -such as a revolution in 
other nations (particularly neighboring ones)-, may serve to empower opposing political forces in the home 
country (both physically as well as mentally). This definitely has a negative impact on the regime or security 
of the home country. Therefore, by seeking to establish regimes in other nations that are very much similar 
to that of their own, incumbent rulers may effectively strengthen the very foundations upon which their own 
regimes are based.
Second, it may be the case that when other nations adopt certain regimes, benefits are accrued to the home 
country in terms of its international relationships. Some examples include the argument of democratic peace 
(Russett 1993), which proposes that democratic nations do not wage wars on one another; the theory that the 
more similar the political regimes of nations are, the more difficult it is for them to engage in armed conflict 
(Werner 2000); and the finding that prolonged periods of peace have often been observed among countries 
where the spread of political regimes have taken place after a war (Lo. et al. 2008). Furthermore, it has been 
observed that countries with similar constitutional systems tend to form alliances much more easily than 
countries with different constitutional systems (Siverson and Emmons 1991). In addition, the domestic politi-
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cal regimes of other countries tend to weigh heavily on the international balance of power. And apart from 
theories that have to do with national security, there is the argument that democratic nations are more open in 
their dealings with the market, as well as in terms of foreign outward investment (Milner and Kubota 2005). 
All the above examples show that the adoption of political regimes by other countries that are similar to that 
of the home country, tends to have tremendously beneficial effects on the latter, in terms of its dealings in na-
tional security issues and the international political economy.
Due to the two explanatory factors explained above, countries tend to reap benefits when other countries 
adopt political regimes of a particular kind. (This applies, whether we are looking at the domestic or interna-
tional context). For this reason, the domestic regimes of countries surfaces as an issue -and may at times even 
serve to cause conflicts among countries- at the international level.
This does not simply imply that we have yet another issue to resolve in terms of disputes among nations. 
What is of utmost importance here, is to note that because countries now have an incentive to challenge the 
authority of the incumbent rulers of other nations, peaceful resolution tends to take on a heightened level of 
difficulty (Aron 1966: 101). This is because countries may aim to overthrow the regimes of other countries. 
Furthermore, challenges to other countries may now be fueled by a sense of righteousness or obligation, mak-
ing it all the more difficult to achieve resolution via negotiation (Wight 1978: 92).
(2) Analytical Concepts
The previous section considered why domestic political regimes might be an issue of concern to the inter-
national society. The next issue of consideration before heading straight into the analysis would be the clas-
sification of individual countries’ behavior or stance towards diversity.
A typology of the actions which individual countries have adopted with respects to heterogeneity will 
first be presented. There are three general categories, “elimination”, “imposition of constraints”, and “non-
problematization”. A country which adopts a stance of “elimination” does not tolerate regimes which are 
different from its own, and it always seeks to achieve homogeneity of political traits in the international so-
ciety by either (forcefully) changing the political regimes of other nations via armed force or sanctions, or by 
eradicating entities that are different from themselves. On the other hand, a country which adopts a stance of 
“imposition of constraints” seeks to impose certain domestic political traits on other countries, as conditions 
for gaining membership to the international society or any international organization. It also seeks to prevent 
countries whose domestic regimes differ from theirs, from becoming a member of the international society. 
The recognition of newly established countries, and the inclusion or expulsion of countries into / from the 
international society are some specific examples. While the act of stipulating which countries are eligible for 
full-fledged membership status in the international society seems to resemble the act of “elimination”, the 
“imposition of constraints” can be interpreted as being driven by a desire to maintain the existing level of 
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homogeneity in the international society. Finally, countries which do not treat diversity as an issue of concern 
(“non-problematization”) basically choose to tolerate regimes which differ from their own. These countries 
also seek to stabilize international diplomatic relationships by refraining from treating diversity as an issue at 
the international level.
Next, the condition of international society with respects to diversity among its member countries may be 
categorized into the following three types: “competition”, “predominance”, and “coexistence”. Under a con-
dition of “competition”, various differing ideologies exist, and countries each have their own definition for 
what it takes to become a legitimate member of the international society. Under this condition, countries en-
gage in open confrontation with one another, while asserting the legitimacy of their conditions. On the other 
hand, “predominance” is a condition where in addition to differences in terms of ideology, countries also dif-
fer starkly in terms of balance of power. Under such a condition, a country (or group of countries) which sup-
port a particular ideology wields an overwhelmingly large extent of power in its hands. Finally, “coexistence” 
is a condition where the domestic regimes of countries are not treated as an issue at the international level, 
and where heterogenous entities strive to coexist. An example of such a condition would be when countries 
adhere strictly to the principle of non-intervention.
Evidently, there is a close connection between the level of entity and the level of the system. This paper 
proposes that the three behavioral types of nations at the level of entity -that is, “elimination”, “imposition 
of constraints”, and “non-problematization”- serve to define the three conditions –“competition”, “predomi-
nance”, and “coexistence”- at the level of the system. In other words, this paper adopts a bottom-up approach. 
For example, when countries with differing ideologies seek to homogenize the international society via means 
of “elimination”, the international society tends to experience a condition of “competition” at the systemic 
level. On the other hand, when the international society is under a condition of “predominance” -although 
there have been previous cases where “elimination” was adopted-, it is commonly observed that the superior 
country or group of countries tends to adopt the “imposition of constraints” at the level of the entity, as a 
means to preserve the existing condition of homogeneity. Lastly, when “non-problematization” is adopted at 
the level of the entity, a condition of “coexistence” tends to emerge at the systemic level.
On top of the three conditions explained above, the international society could also experience a condition 
of “homogenous system”. In each of the three conditions explained above, countries were aware of the exis-
tence of heterogeneity among themselves. In contrast to this, the “homogenous system” is a condition where a 
particular trait is no longer perceived as contributing to heterogeneity. As a result, the entities which comprise 
the system come to recognize one another as being homogenous. An important distinction to be made at this 
juncture is that between “coexistence” and the “homogenous system”. Under the former, countries recognize 
that they are heterogenous, and that the differences between them could possibly escalate into problems at the 
international level. They also have a common agreement not to let this happen. In contrast, countries under 
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the “homogenous system” are not aware of the differences among themselves, and they instead perceive one 
another as being homogenous in nature. Table 1 below summarizes the arguments raised above.
Table 1. Systemic conditions and types of behavior under heterogeneity
Condition of the system Competition Predominance Coexistence Homogenous system
Behavior of the entity Elimination Imposition of constraints Non-problematization Not aware of differences
(3) Formula Determining Dynamic Changes in Conditions
While the previous section laid out the concepts which are fundamental to the main argument of this paper, 
the current section will analyze the dynamic relationship between the four conditions of “competition”, “pre-
dominance”, “coexistence”, and “homogenous system”.
First and foremost, let us start by considering a situation where a new ideology is born from a condition 
where domestic regimes are not problematized, or where there are no confrontations regarding the legitimacy 
of the international society. Such a movement can be likened to the birth of Protestantism as the result of the 
corruption of Catholicism. As explained in the previous section, the existence of a heterogenous regime may 
be perceived as an issue where confrontations of an international scale may be sparked off. This puts the 
mechanism of “elimination” to work, with the result that a condition of “competition” between conflicting 
ideologies is born.
There are two distinct paths by which a condition of “competition” converges. The first path would be a 
movement towards “coexistence”. This path is taken, when the cost of “eliminating” a heterogenous opponent 
by force overwhelms the (previously mentioned) benefits of forcefully imposing one’s own regime on the 
opponent. Some possible cases would be when confrontation via armed conflict is prolonged without much 
chance of either faction overwhelming the other; or when confrontation involves the use of nuclear arms, pos-
sibly leading to mass destruction of an irreversible scale. In cases such as these, a condition of “coexistence” 
-and not a condition of “competition” where tolerance for heterogeneity is minimal -, tends to result. In addi-
tion to the case where a country is unable to pay the costs of “eliminating” its opponent, “coexistence” could 
also arise when the countries manage to reach a certain level of agreement between themselves, not to pose as 
a threat to each other’s regime security.    
On the other hand, a condition of “predominance” results, when a particular faction is able to overthrow its 
heterogenous opponents and secure its desired level of homogeneity in the international society. Furthermore, 
once that faction has succeeded in eliminating heterogenous elements, it would very likely seek to impose 
constraints upon the institutional system of the international society, in order to maintain the condition of ho-
mogeneity it has achieved. Finally, the condition of a “homogenous system” can be seen to be the upshot of 
“coexistence” and “predominance”, since this is a condition where differences are no longer perceived to be 
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an issue by the countries concerned. As opposed to a condition of “coexistence”, where entities that are het-
erogenous in nature choose to coexist due to the high costs involved in confrontation, under a “homogenous 
system”, heterogenous traits cease to be an issue of concern in international politics. On the other hand, when 
“predominance” is carried out to its utmost measure, there will come a condition where all ideologies that dif-
fer from the ruling ideology have been eliminated and therefore cease to exist. For the above reasons, when 
conditions of “coexistence” and “predominance” are allowed to develop, these conditions will both converge 
eventually to the “homogenous system”.
An important point to highlight here, is that this paper differs from Aron’s in terms of its recognition of the 
different conditions which exist. Aron raised the earlier half of the 18th century and the Vienna System as ex-
amples of a “homogenous system”. In contrast, this paper views both examples as being of a different essential 
nature from the homogenous system. In the case of the former, countries first chose not to treat the diversity 
among themselves as an issue, and this developed into a condition of “coexistence”, which finally gave rise to 
a “homogenous system”. In contrast, in the case of the latter, countries first chose to adopt “elimination”, which 
led to a condition of “predominance”. In addition, a characteristic of Aron’s “homogenous system” is a respect 
for the principle of non-intervention, (by the countries belonging to the system) (Aron 1966: 147). In contrast, 
according to my definition of a “homogenous system”, the motivating rationale for the establishment of the 
principle of non-intervention is not the homogeneity of traits, but rather the need to impose a certain degree of 
cooperation where heterogeneity is prevalent. For this reason, I assert that a condition where countries abide by 
the principle of non-intervention is a condition of “coexistence”, rather than a “homogenous system”.
2. Overview of Macro History
From this section onwards, the focus of the paper will shift to the task of justifying how the theoretical 
framework presented above is applicable to the history of international society. The analysis will be based on 
three previous studies, all of which provide us with a macro overview of the history of the international system.
Let us first consider Aron’s theory, which was mentioned previously. Which phases of history did Aron 
consider the international society to be “homogenous systems” and “heterogenous systems”, respectively? Al-
though Aron did not provide us with an exhaustive or systematic answer to the above, as far as his argument 
is clear, he considers the period starting from religious wars to the French revolution (or the holy alliance) 
to be the phase where the international society was a homogenous system (Aron 1966: 100). On the other 
hand, he points out that the international society was partially a homogenous system in 1914, but it gradually 
evolved into a heterogenous system after that, and continued being so throughout the Cold War period after 
1945 (Aron 1966: 101).
A second study will be based is Owen’s study (Owen 2010). Owen constructed a data set comprised of an 
40 国際公共政策研究 第19巻第1号
exhaustive list of cases, where countries sought to impose their own domestic regimes on other countries via 
use of force. The period of analysis is 1510 to 2010. All the cases in Owen’s data set belong to the category 
known as “elimination” in this paper. Based on his analysis of the data, Owen pointed out that there were 
three broad waves in international history, where regime imposition took place. The first took place over the 
period of 1520 to the early 18th century, where Catholics and Protestants engaged in regime imposition. The 
second was during the 1770s to the later half of the 19th century, where different groups of countries sought 
to spread the three prominent regimes of absolute monarchy; constitutional monarchy; and republicanism. 
Finally, the third stretched over the period of 1910 to the 1980s, where the ideologies of liberal democracy; 
republicanism; and fascism were being contested against one another.
Owen referred to the period in time when domestic traits of countries were not problematized -that is, when 
regime imposition was absent- as a period of “normal” international relations, or realpolitik (Owen 2010: 49). 
A general glimpse at the data would put this period between the time of Westphalia to the French Revolution 
or the latter half of the 19th century. The implication of this is that the period in international history where 
concepts such as raison d’Etat and realpolitik were applicable, is surprisingly short. A similar implication 
would be that the period where nations recognized themselves as “like units” is also surprisingly short
In fact, the above is the focus of Wight’s study (Wight 1974: 81-94). Similar to Owen, Wight referred to 
the period of international history where power politics -or the calculation of national interests- was the sole 
driving force behind countries’ actions, as a period of “normal” international relations. He clearly chose to 
distinguish this phase in time from the period in international history where fanaticism over the rightfulness 
of domestic doctrines -often responsible for sparking off domestic revolution- were brought into the interna-
tional sphere. As opposed to the period of “normal” international relations, Wight referred to the latter as a 
period of international revolution. In addition, Wight pointed out three waves of international revolution over 
the course of history: (1) religious revolution; (2) the French revolution; and (3) the Russian revolution (Wight 
1974: 82). To be more precise, Wight classified the following periods in history as phases of “normal interna-
tional relations”: 1492-1517, 1648-1792 and 1871-1914; and the following periods as phases of “international 
revolution”:  1517-1648; 1792-1871 and 1914-1960.
Between Owen and Wight, there is mutual consent that the period in time between the religious wars and 
the French revolution; and the latter half of the 19th century, were periods of power politics. As I have high-
lighted before, these two periods are surprisingly short, if we were to consider them in relation to the entire 
course of international history. Furthermore, judging by the length in time, the phase where international so-
ciety was characterized by power politics was not remarkably different (i.e. longer or shorter) from the phase 
where it was characterized by international revolution. In fact, the concepts that we use to model international 
relations such as realpolitik and power politics rarely apply to the normal condition of the international soci-
ety. Therefore, I firmly believe that there is the need to develop theories on the condition of international rela-
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tions during periods of international revolution; or when international society is undergoing dynamic transi-
tions between the two phases mentioned above.
3. The End of Religious Wars and the Creation of a System with Balance of Power
This section onwards, the focus of the paper will shift to describing case studies where order in the inter-
national society was upset by the heterogeneity of countries’ domestic political traits. Similar to the existing 
literature described above, the argument will commence with an analysis of the time when members of the 
international society began on a confrontational note, that is, during the advent of religious wars. It will then 
trace the process where the appeal of religion as a justification for engaging in war against another country 
became increasingly diminished. In general, this section will cover the advent of religious wars in the 16th 
century, until the start of the French revolution.
In the 16th century, disputes regarding differences in countries’ domestic political traits were caused mainly 
by the confrontation between the two religious denominations of Catholicism and Protestantism. This period 
can be understood within the analytical framework of this paper as follows. First, with the birth of Protestant-
ism began a period of mutual elimination -or a condition of “competition”-between the Catholics and Protes-
tants. The motivating factor behind the two denominations’ quest for political dominance was the desire for a 
heightened regime security and a greater influence over the international society. However, as neither faction 
emerged victorious in the series of fierce and prolonged disputes between the two religious denominations, 
by the 1640s, it became increasingly evident that both sides were militarily exhausted. As a result, both sides 
consented to be tolerant of each other, and to enter a condition of “coexistence”. Consequently, with the wane 
of religious differences as a cause of interstate confrontation came the birth of a “homogenous system”.
Closely related to the series of political changes described above was the creation of the sovereign state 
system. Under this system, diplomatic relationships among entities known as sovereign states came to be 
built upon a format of specific norms and behavioral rules. For the following reasons, the wane of religious 
differences as a cause for military confrontation had a large role to play in the creation of the sovereign state 
system. First, as political authority was ceded from the Roman Catholic Pope to the lineage based monarchy, 
dynastic legitimacy came to be widely recognized throughout the international society. For this reason, order 
in the international society was changed from the Christian-based order -which had the Roman Catholic Pope 
holding absolute authority- to the sovereign state system, under which horizontal relationships were forged 
among individual sovereign states. Second, the Treaty of Westphalia which was ratified in 1648 -bringing a 
close to the Peace of Augsburg in 1555 and the Thirty Years War- stipulated that under the new international 
order, states were to preserve the religious denomination which they had been subject to, under the Holy Ro-
man Empire. This was a founding cause for the principle of non-intervention in the new world order. It also 
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signified that those who had wielded positions of authority under the previous world order now had an advan-
tage over the secular world, in terms of claiming political authority under the new order.
In the manner described above, the sovereign state system was borne in the aftermath of the religious wars, 
when states agreed to give up on their pursuit of a rightful religion or a rightful empire. In the introductory 
section of this paper, it was mentioned that a basic principle of international relations is not to question the 
domestic political traits of nations. This principle has its roots in the mutual consensus by Western countries 
during the 16th and 17th centuries, not to treat religious differences as an issue of dispute. Eventually, this 
consensus developed into more general principles -such as the principle of non-intervention- within the inter-
national society.
The next question we must now consider, is when exactly “competition” evolved into “coexistence”. A key 
to answering this question would be the need to reconsider the myth of Westphalia, an argument which has 
been prominent since the 1990s (Osiander 2001). This argument states that there is the need to revise the un-
derstanding that the international order underwent a dramatic change from the medieval system to the sover-
eign state system, when the treaty of Westphalia was ratified. According to this argument, the terms stipulated 
by the treaty of Westphalia were no more than a ratification of the status quo. Indeed, if one were to consider 
when the concept of the international society -based on non-intervention and the equality of states- was con-
structed, a review of the history of thought and international law would point to the time of Vattel, or perhaps 
Pufendorf (if we were to set the date somewhat earlier) (Knutsen 1992: 113-114). This implies that it is quite 
a theoretical leap to suggest that the system of sovereign states was created by the treaty of Westphalia. How-
ever, even having said so, it does remain a fact that the treaty of Westphalia was an important point in time for 
the international system, as it transited from a condition of “competition” to “coexistence”. Take, for instance, 
the fact that the international society underwent a period of intense secularization with the ratification of the 
treaty of Westphalia (Philpott 2001: 89). Also, according to the findings of Holsti -who collected and analyzed 
an exhaustive list of wars-, out of 51 issues which sparked off 22 wars during the period of 1648-1713, only 3 
issues had to do with differences in religion (Holsti 1991: 49). The ratio of interstate wars which were caused 
by religious differences, as opposed to those which were caused by other trait differences, shrank even further 
during 1715-1814 (Holsti 1991: 88). In this way, the analysis of changes in the reasons for countries’ going to 
war suggests a transition from “competition” to “coexistence”, and finally a “homogenous system”.
With regards to religious issues, the transition of the international system to a condition of “coexistence” 
and finally that of a “homogenous system”, symbolized the start of an era of classical power politics, or re-
alpolitik. Under this era, the legitimacy of states were no longer founded upon abstract concepts (Osiander 
1994), but rather upon the succession of the throne; territorial issues; and conquests for new land. A focus of 
this paper is that one of the major characteristics of this period in time, is the establishment of the balance of 
power in international society (Anderson 1993: 165; Vagts and Vagts 1979). The balance of power was stipu-
43Heterogeneity and Order in International Society
lated in international agreements such as the Utrecht Treaty, and also became a prominent argument among 
philosophers and lawyers. In other words, it was during this period in time that the atomic unit known as the 
state came to be recognized as the building block of the international society; and the balance of power as the 
official condition of order of that society (Clark 2005: 75; Knutsen 1992: 140-141). Louis XIVs quest to ex-
pand his sphere of influence over the international society also had an important bearing on this.
I would like to emphasize that the establishment of the balance of power as a norm in international society 
is a phenomenon that is unique to a condition of “coexistence”, or a “homogenous system”. The reason for 
this observation is that the establishment of the balance of power as a norm, marks the widespread sentiment 
that imperialism (and the unequal concentration of power which result from imperialism), are evils of the in-
ternational society. Such a situation, where the domination of all other states by a single state is perceived as 
undesirable, can only result when the heterogeneity of domestic political traits (such as the rise of a new reli-
gious order or republicanism) are not being problematized. While the balance of power has also been used as 
a policy during conditions of “competition”, its application under such a condition tends to take on a different 
meaning (as compared to when it is applied under a condition of “coexistence” or a “homogenous system”).
4. The Vienna system as a condition of “predominance”
As explained above, a system of international relations based upon a value standard that was entirely differ-
ent from the domestic value standard of individual states, was formed in the 18th century. A typical example 
of one such value standard would be the need to upkeep the balance of power. In other words, the interna-
tional society sought to avoid the secularization of military conflicts, by excluding domestic political concepts 
of righteousness from the new system of International Relations. This condition was however disrupted, by a 
series of revolutions which took place in the latter half of the 19th century.
The first to take place was the independence of the United States of America. In retrospect, it can be said 
that the United States possessed the characteristics of a revolutionary state, since it had a firm conviction 
regarding the importance of the revolution taking place within its national boundaries (which was fueled by 
both a sense of moral obligation as well as a sentiment of distrust towards the old regime). On the other hand, 
by choosing to refrain from taking a clearly opposed stance towards monarchism, the United States was also 
able to portray itself as a non-revolutionary state- in other words, a full-fledged member of the international 
society (Armstrong 1993: 76).
In this sense, the French Revolution was a stark contrast to the United States. As the “Declaration of the 
Rights of Man and of the Citizen” in 1789 exemplifies, the French Revolution was motivated by a desire to 
challenge the existing domestic regime in France, as revolutionists sought to deliver the message that political 
authority should be held in the hands of the nation and its citizens, instead of the monarchy. Moreover, given 
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that it was driven by the desire to oppose the autocratic government, the French Revolution can be said to be 
a manifestation of cosmopolitanism, an idea that all existing boundaries which separate human beings should 
be overcome. In this manner, the revolution in France served as a catalyst for challenging not only the domes-
tic political regimes of other states, but also the sovereign state system, which was the existing condition of 
order of the time. Interestingly, a doctrine justifying the legitimacy of the monarchy was formed, under the in-
fluence of the French Revolution (Holmes 1982: 166). An implication of this is that up till that point in time, 
monarchies had been perceived as nothing more than a state of politics, and there had been no need to justify 
the legitimacy of a monarchy within the international society.
With the onset of the French Revolution came the birth of a new clash of ideology, regarding whether po-
litical authority should be held in the hands of the monarch or the nation. For this reason, revolutions were 
conventionally seen as a threat to the European public law, or the European Commonwealth as a whole. From 
the 1790s onwards, proponents of both sides embarked in a competition to forcedly impose their ideology 
on other nation states (Owen 2010: 126), shifting the condition of international society to that of “competi-
tion”, where individual state entities engaged in “elimination”. Given that the nature of conflict was as such, 
any sort of compromise regarding national interests could not possibly take place between France and the 
other nation states of the world (Bukovansky 2004: 169, 204), and Europe once again found itself in a con-
dition that was highly comparable to that under the religious wars in the 17th century (Bull 1977, 41). The 
end result, however, differed substantially. In contrast to the religious wars, where war-impoverished states 
consented to enter a state of “coexistence”, the French Revolution ended with the victory of the constitutional 
monarchy state in the Napoleonic Wars, transiting the international society into a condition of “predominance”.
As a result, the Vienna system, drafted after the Napoleonic Wars, adopted an “imposition of constraints”, 
where entities bearing traits heterogenous to the constitutional monarchy state were barred from membership 
in the international society. Under the Vienna system, rules and standards defining what it meant to be a mem-
ber of international society were laid, and traditional monarchy states were defined as legitimate members of 
the international society (Osiander1994: 221; Clark 2005: 86; Bukovansky 2003 :163). For example, during 
the congress at Troppau in 1820, participants declared that revolutions conducted by illegal means would not 
be tolerated, and that any such form of conduct would warrant immediate military intervention. A characteris-
tic of the Vienna system was the control of international society by five large nations (Simpson 2004; 35), and 
those large nations laid the rules regarding the legitimacy of domestic political regimes.
One reason why rules regarding legitimacy was so important, was because this had to do with the issue of 
interference. The spread of revolution across national boundaries implied that the domestic problems of one 
nation state could no longer be contained within that state itself. For this matter, neighboring countries began 
to intervene actively in the domestic affairs of states that were subject to the dangers of revolution, during the 
early 19th century (Weber 1995). In the sense that the Vienna system legitimized a particular form of govern-
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ment and encouraged the export of a particular domestic political system in order to upkeep order in the inter-
national society, Metternich who led the Vienna system can be said to bear similarities with Wilson, who will 
be described later on.
The role which the balance of power had to play under the Vienna system is an interesting one. As pre-
viously explained, when the balance of power served as a norm for international society during the 18th 
century, it was founded upon the homogeneity of countries’ domestic traits, and a similar aim shared by all 
members of international society with respects to foreign diplomatic policy. In contrast, while scholars have 
sometimes remarked that the Vienna system is also founded upon the balance of power, this balance of power 
is in fact very different from the one that existed in the 18th century. As Shroeder who analyzed official dis-
courses during the Congress of Vienna highlighted, the international world order at the time of the Vienna 
system believed the preservation of conservative ideologies and principles to be necessary for sustaining the 
equilibrium in international society (Schroeder 2004: 227; Knutsen 1992: 161-162). In other words, equilib-
rium during this period of time refers not to the physical distribution of military power across nation states, 
but rather an order based upon morality and law. These two opposing interpretations of the balance of power 
coincide with the international society being under a condition of “coexistence”, and a condition of “predomi-
nance”, respectively.
The Vienna system was, however, to collapse eventually, after a revolution which took place in 1848. With 
the collapse of the system came an era of power politics or realpolitik, in the latter half of the 19th century. 
During this period of time, the balance of power took on an entirely different meaning. It was no longer a 
norm for international society as it was in the 18th century, nor a means to sustain a particular regime like it 
was during the earlier half of the 19th century. In contrast, the balance of power came to be seen as a form 
of national policy during the era of power politics (Schroeder 2004: 239). At this juncture, there is the need 
to consider the question of why international society did not fall into a condition of “competition” between 
different ideologies, with the rapid spread of nationalism during the late 19th century. First, as exemplified 
by the fact that almost all European countries came to adopt a voting system during the later half of the 19th 
century, the political influence of the constitutional monarch state had waned significantly. Second, as op-
posed to the French Revolution, nationalism in the late 19th century was not driven by cosmopolitanism, but 
rather a strong emphasis on the bond between different ethnicities. For this reason, the tearing down of na-
tional boundaries came to be seen as inevitable. Third, whether it be the case of Italy or Germany, it was clear 
that the formation of a nation state could not be possible without the approval of neighboring countries. Thus, 
there was a common sentiment to keep domestic value systems divorced from foreign policy, and to carry out 
the formation of nation states within the framework of the sovereign state system. In this way, the latter half 
of the 19th century was a period in history where domestic political traits were not problematized at the inter-
national level.
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5. Post Versailles system: the intermingling of all three conditions
Initially, diplomatic relationships forged during World War I were devoid of ideology, but were motivated 
instead by a desire to either maintain or reform the status quo. However, as countries joined forces to support 
their cause during the war, World War I came to be perceived as a war against the autocracy. Consequently, 
all countries external to the alliance came to be perceived as the enemy, and democracy took on a new status 
as the legitimate regime of international society.
Furthermore, the international order became much more complicated after the war, as it assumed additional 
conditions of competition and predominance, in addition to the condition of coexistence which it had been 
subject to throughout the latter half of the 19th century. In other words, all three types of behavior: elimina-
tion; imposition of constraints; and non-problematization, came to be observed at the level of the entity. Three 
important factors which contributed to this situation are (1) the setting of democracy as a standard for interna-
tional society; (2) the participation of the United States in the construction of the international system; and (3) 
the Russian Revolution.
President Wilson -known for his active involvement in the Paris peace conference- had made it clear ever 
since the war, that the enemies of the Allied forces were not the citizens of Germany, but rather the milita-
rist autocracy. He also played an active role in ensuring that self-determination and democracy were imple-
mented in the domestic political regimes of countries under the influence of the United States, after the war. 
In Wilson’s perspective, the formation of a collective security system comprised of democratic nations was 
absolutely crucial for the realization of international peace (Ikenberry 2001: Ch. 5). For this reason, the post 
war system has often been interpreted as having undergone a transition to a condition of predominance, when 
international standards regarding the appropriate form of governance were defined at Versailles (Clark 2005: 
109-110). For example, Wight highlights that Versailles was a symbol of the French Revolutionists’ final 
victory over the Holy Alliance in Europe (Wight 1974: 85). The fact that defeated nations were treated like 
criminals can also be seen an extension of the above argument.
A further problem which the international society was faced with, in addition to the axis of conflict between 
democracy and autocracy, was the Russian Revolution. Similar to the way in which the desire to oppose liber-
alism and nationalism united the participants of the Vienna system, fear of the spread of the Russian Revolu-
tion too, served to coagulate the Western forces. This is best illustrated by the intervention in Siberia, where 
the deployment of arms clearly signifies “elimination”. While Britain and Frances’ war against the Soviets 
ended in 1920, anti-Soviet propaganda continued throughout the entire period of war (Halperin 1997: 145; 
Bisley 2004: 52). Moreover, war-time policies aimed at appeasing Germany and opposing the Soviets had to 
take into caution not to provoke left-wing elements. For this reason, these policies cannot be understood sim-
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ply in terms of physical power (Haas 2005). Based on the above considerations, it can be said that the interna-
tional society’s stance towards the Russian Revolution was based upon the mechanism of “competition”, this 
in turn being motivated by the dynamics of “elimination”.
In addition to possessing elements of the “imposition of constraints” and “elimination”, the Versailles 
system also sought to realize world peace by being inclusive towards all its members. In this way, it also pos-
sessed the element of “coexistence” (Simpson 2004; 260-263). While the first statute of the alliance required 
that a country be a self-governing state in order to qualify for membership, democracy was not stated as a for-
mal requirement. For this reason, even autocratic nations such as the Soviet Union became members at a later 
stage in time. In practice, Wilson’s ideologies were not materialized, and the system increasingly exhibited 
behavioral patterns of “coexistence” over time. This was due in part to the belief that world peace could be 
achieved more realistically via collective security -where international society took on an inclusive stance to-
wards its members-; and in part to a shift in emphasis on the part of the Soviet Union, from a desire to export 
its revolutionary ideas (based on cosmopolitanism), to the survival and stability of state socialism (Armstrong 
1993; Ch. 4). In other words, the Soviet Union found itself in a dilemma, where on the one hand it wished to 
challenge the sovereign state system via means of revolution, while on the other hand it had to become a sov-
ereign state itself, in order to survive. These elements gave the international society an additional behavioral 
characteristic of “coexistence”, where the system sought to be inclusive towards all its member states.
This situation, where the international system possessed all three behavioral characteristics (of “predomi-
nance”; “competition”; and “coexistence”), persisted even after World War II. Post World War II, the world 
regime, while having eliminated Fascism, was composed of two ideological camps -the liberalists and the 
socialists- where each recognized the other as an entity distinctly heterogenous from itself.
A relationship of “competition” was first established between the two opposing camps, as exemplified by 
the Cold War, which was an open conflict over differences in domestic regimes. The extent of influence which 
each side held, was determined by the domestic political and economic situation of individual states all over 
the world. Therefore, the United States and the Soviet Union each sought to intervene actively in the domestic 
regimes of regions all over the world, and to create political regimes which bore traits similar to each of their 
own, in these regions.
Even against this backdrop, democracy had secured for itself an unrivaled importance in the post World 
War II regime, to the extent that there was hardly any entity which frowned upon or sought to openly chal-
lenge democracy in the existing world order (Macpherson 1966; McFaul 2004). Most nation states also began 
to declare themselves “democratic nations” during this time. Even so, one can hardly say that democracy as 
an ideology enjoyed “predominance”. This is because the United States and the Soviet Union each had very 
different ideals regarding democracy, and each perceived itself to be the unrivaled role model of democracy.
Furthermore, there was no mention of democracy in the United Nations (UN) charter. While the argument 
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of whether or not to include conditions required for membership to the UN was raised prior to the San Fran-
cisco declaration (Simpson 2004; 263-277), the only condition that was ever formally imposed was that of 
being a “peace loving state”. The very act of imposing conditions on membership to the UN can be seen as 
a desire to achieve a higher degree of homogeneity among the members of the UN. However, it is important 
to note that the concept of “homogeneity” here is a flexible one, since the condition did not require the UN’s 
members to adopt any specific regime. This is, of course, with the exception that in the initial phase of the 
UN, a couple of applications for membership were in fact rejected, suggesting that the desire for homogeneity 
sometimes overwhelmed the need for inclusiveness (Simpson 2004; 270).
It is important to note that the primary motivation of the UN was not to achieve “predominance” via the 
forced implementation of some particular ideology, but instead to foster “coexistence” among its members, 
via the promotion of inclusiveness and impartiality. The UN charter’s clause on non-intervention shows that 
the UN differs starkly from the war-time alliance (Barkin 1994; 123-124). Moreover, -the few exceptions 
mentioned above aside- the rapid growth of UN members after the war clearly indicates the UN’s strife for 
inclusiveness, and up to date, no member has been ousted from the club. With respects to its diplomatic rec-
ognition of third world countries, the UN has also restrained from imposing any particular sort of political 
trait as a necessary requirement for recognition (Fabry 2010; Ch. 5).
For the above reasons, “predominance” waned significantly, and while the Western and Eastern camps per-
sisted in a condition of intense “competition”, international society began to seek for a condition of “coexis-
tence”. This was catalyzed by the institutionalization of the UN. Three factors which facilitated “coexistence” 
were (1) general similarities (between the East and West), such as a respect for human rights and democratic 
values after the “elimination” of Fascism; (2) the fundamental incompatibility of liberalism and socialism as 
ideologies; and (3) a mutual agreement on the importance of preventing another world war.
With the closure of the Cold War, “competition” ended, “coexistence” waned, and democracy came to as-
sume “predominance” (McFaul 2004). This was exemplified by the UN’s monitoring of elections and aiding 
of democratization, where a necessary condition for receiving UN aid was the adoption of democracy. Simi-
larly, a requirement for becoming a member of organizations such as the OSCE, EU and OAS, was to be a 
democratic nation. The use of armed force has also been justified in the name of spreading democracy, as seen 
in the USA’s attempts at regime imposition in Afghanistan and Iraq. Within the analytical framework of this 
paper, the above examples can be perceived as the “imposition of constraints”, or “elimination”.
Conclusion
Realpolitik is based on the idea that international relationships are based primarily on the pursuit of na-
tional interest, that is, the principle of raison d’État. It also suggests that ideology plays little role in shaping 
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international relationships. However, as we have seen throughout the course of this paper, realpolitik was 
not the state which the international society was subject to, throughout most of its history. Having made this 
point clear, scholars of International Relations should strive to analyze the relationship between heterogeneity 
among the members of international society and the order of the society, (instead of treating realpolitik as the 
prototype of international politics). This is also the fundamental theme of this paper.
As compared to previous research such as Aron’s study, a distinguishing feature of this paper would be its 
attempt to consider “predominance” and “coexistence” separately, each as a possible end to a process where 
opposing ideologies converge. By adopting such an approach, this paper highlighted the existence of funda-
mentally heterogenous systems within what was conventionally believed to be a “homogenous system”. It 
also illustrated the complexity of alliances and the United Nations, by analyzing the different conditions of 
international society during different phases of its history. It is important to understand that the degree of ho-
mogeneity or heterogeneity in the system at any point in time, is decided entirely by the members which com-
pose it. In other words, the degree of heterogeneity within international society at any point in time, cannot 
be judged by some objective numerical indicator, such as the ratio of Catholics to Protestants; or the ratio of 
monarchists to republicans. This is because the same ratio (of one group to another) could at times be treated 
as an issue of debate at the international level, and overlooked at other times, depending on the subjective 
mindset of the members of international society. Hence, the degree of heterogeneity in the international soci-
ety is determined entirely by the subjective views of the members which comprise it.
This paper also considered the conditions necessary for the upkeep of public interest within international 
society. In order for the members of international society to recognize themselves as constituents of a unified 
body, and to share some sort of responsibility with regards to the protection of the interests of international 
society as a whole, it is necessary that the international society not be in a condition of “competition”. To this 
end, the degree of heterogeneity within international society (as perceived by its members), has a large role to 
play in defining the existence of public interest within the society itself.
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